Dong Lin

The emphasis of the paper is on the unraveling of the dynamics of price formation and strategic decision-making in international business negotiation by a thorough game-theoretic analysis. The discussion will start with a detailed examination of price negotiation as part of the wider discussion of international business negotiations. Using game theory as an analytical tool, this paper explores the complex character of the negotiation process, breaking it down into its game-like features and developing a game model that reflects its subtle dynamics. Based on the Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining model, the paper examines the game solution to benefit sharing and expected prices results. Moreover, the utility theory is used to determine the possible points of solutions in the international commercial price negotiation especially when there are payments involved. The discussion ends with a powerful discussion of game solutions based on international business negotiations, discussing effective strategies and giving suggestions to negotiating parties on how to maximize benefits during the process. This discussion does not only provide light on theoretical concepts but also provides practical advice on real life situations and helps to gain a better insight into strategic decision-making in international business negotiations.

Game Theory; Price Formation; Strategic Analysis; International Business; Negotiation Strategies

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